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OPENING THE DOORS TO JUSTICE IN AFRICA: ANALYZING STATE ACCEPTANCE OF THE RIGHT
OF INDIVIDUAL APPLICATION TO THE AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS
SIMON ZSCHIRNT
Abstract: The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights took its place as the youngest of the
three regional human rights courts with its establishment in 2006. However, the Court’s
jurisdiction remains a work in progress. Thirty of the African Union’s fifty-five member states
have ratified the protocol allowing the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to
refer cases to the Court but only ten have made the optional declaration allowing individuals direct
access. Previous research has indicated that transitional states desirous of “locking in” new
commitments to democracy and human rights have been particularly likely to ratify the protocol
but there has been little analysis of optional declarations, which have been the primary means by
which cases have reached the Court. This article fills this gap by analyzing the circumstances
underlying optional declarations. It finds that most have been associated with consolidations of
prior democratic transitions.
Keywords: African Union; African human rights system; African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights; Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights; optional declaration
1

Introduction

Great expectations greeted the establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(ACtHPR) with the swearing in of its eleven judges on 2 July 2006. With the establishment of the
ACtHPR, the African human rights system joined the European and Inter-American human rights
systems as the third regional human rights system with a specialized human rights court
empowered to enforce regional human rights treaties by adjudicating claims against states. The
successes of the ACtHPR’s European and Inter-American counterparts led to the establishment of
the ACtHPR being declared a “watershed moment” and “the beginning of true human rights
enforcement” on a troubled continent that despite having “led the way in the promulgation of
human rights treaties” had recently experienced genocides in Rwanda and Darfur and mass
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atrocities on a scale unseen since the Second World War in the Congo War.1
However, the subsequent history of the ACtHPR has somewhat tempered this enthusiasm. On
the one hand, the ACtHPR has become an innovator in certain areas of international law and has
delivered a number of landmark decisions that have attracted global attention. These have recently
included, for example, its condemnation of Mali’s failure to set a minimum age of marriage for
women and ensure women’s consent to marriage and its condemnation of Kenya’s denial of an
indigenous community its communal right to its ancestral lands.2 By affirming in the latter case
that rights to culture are collective rights and that any development projects must obtain consent
from impacted indigenous communities, the ACtHPR went beyond existing international law.3
This has led some to praise the ACtHPR as a court that has quickly become a “formidable judicial
institution that can boldly articulate and apply the law.”4 However, on the other hand, others have
critiqued the ACtHPR as an institution that has not lived up to its promise due to “structural
deficiencies, meager caseloads, low compliance rates, and persistent budgetary issues.”5
Caseload has been a particular concern because access to the ACtHPR is more limited than its
European counterpart, which allows individuals and NGOs to bring claims directly against any
contracting state. Individuals and NGOs may bring claims directly to the ACtHPR only if the state
involved has not only ratified the ACtHPR Protocol but also made an additional optional
declaration, which only ten states have done (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia,

Scott Lyons, “The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2006) 10:24 ASIL Insights, online:
<https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/10/issue/24/african-court-human-and-peoples-rights>.
2
Association pour les Progrès et la Défense des Droits des Femmes Maliennes and the Institute for Human Rights
and Development in Africa v. Republic of Mali, Judgment, Afr Ct Hum Peoples’ Rts (11 May 2018); African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Republic of Kenya, Judgment, Afr Ct Hum Peoples’ Rts (26 May 2017).
3
See Chelsea Purvis, “Africa as a Generator of Human Rights Law” (2013) 107 ASIL Proc 480 at 481-82.
4
Vincent O. Nmehielle, “Seven Years in Business: Evaluating Developments at the African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights” (2013) 17:1 Law Democracy Dev 317 at 327.
5
Daniel Abebe, “Does International Human Rights Law in African Courts Make a Difference?” (2016) 56:3 Va J Intl
Law 527 at 527.
1
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Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Tunisia), one of which (Rwanda) subsequently
withdrew its declaration.6 Cases involving state parties that have not made the declaration must
be referred by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), a quasi-judicial
body that is the decision-maker of first instance in the African system. A lack of referrals due to
the ACHPR’s reluctance to exercise its discretion (there have only been three referrals in the
history of the ACtHPR) has meant that the vast majority of the cases that the ACtHPR has
adjudicated have come before it via petitions filed directly against the relatively few states that
have made the declaration.
Increasing the number of optional declaration states is thus the key to increasing the
effectiveness of the ACtHPR and is the subject of this article. Building upon previous research
analyzing ratifications of the ACtHPR Protocol, it analyzes the factors that may have inclined
some state parties to take the additional step of making the optional declaration. The article
proceeds as follows: the following two sections provide a brief overview of the African human
rights system and survey the literature on state accession to international human rights regimes,
the fourth section examines the extent to which optional declarations have fit the patterns identified
by the literature, and the final section discusses the implications for the future of the ACtHPR.

2

The African Human Rights System and the ACtHPR in Brief

The African human rights system was established in 1981 with the adoption of the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights by what was then known as the Organization of African Unity
(OAU).7 The content of the Charter is generally similar to the American Convention on Human

See International Commission of Jurists, “Gambia: Declaration Allowing Access to African Court a Major
Advance for Access to Justice” (25 November 2018), online: <https://www.icj.org/gambia-declaration-allowingaccess-to-african-court-a-major-advance-for-access-to-justice/>.
7
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1982) 21 I.L.M. 59 (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21
October 1986) (1982).
6
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Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights insofar as it protects core civil and political
rights (i.e. rights to freedom of speech and religion, to freedom from discrimination, to property,
to due process of law, etc.) as well as a host of economic, social, and cultural rights. The Charter
took effect upon obtaining the requisite number of ratifications in 1986 and has since been ratified
by fifty-four AU member states. The entry into force of the Charter also brought into being the
ACHPR, which is charged with enforcement of the Charter. Comprised of eleven commissioners
elected to six-year terms by the AU Assembly to “promote human and peoples’ rights and ensure
their protection in Africa,” the ACHPR is vested with protective power under which individuals
and NGOs may bring claims against states for violations of the Charter.8
However, the ACHPR’s use of this protective power has been the subject of a number of
criticisms.

In particular, the ACHPR has been criticized for producing decisions that are

“formulaic” and “attract little, if any, attention from governments and the human rights
community.”9 The ability of the ACHPR to compel change in the behavior of states has also been
limited by the fact that decisions finding violations of the Charter are merely non-binding
recommendations. Consequently, full compliance has been estimated at a mere 14%.10 In addition
to its protective power, the ACHPR is also responsible for overseeing biannual reporting by states
on their human rights records, which is required under Article 62 of the Charter. However, this
process has been plagued by sporadic and incomplete reporting and by the ACHPR’s observations
and recommendations having little impact.11 Thus, the judgment of many observers has been that

8

Ibid, Art. 30.
Makau W. Mutua, “The African Human Rights Court: A Two-Legged Stool?” (1999) 21:2 Hum Rts Q 342 at 348.
10
Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, “State Compliance With the Recommendations of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1994-2004” (2007) 101:1 Am J Intl Law 1 at 5.
11
See e.g. Felice D. Gaer, “First Fruits: Reporting by States Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights” (1992) 10:1 Neth Q Hum Rights 29; Frans Viljoen, “State Reporting Under the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights: A Boost from the South” (2000) 44:1 J Afr Law 110; Takele S. Bulto, “Beyond the Promises:
Resuscitating the State Reporting Procedure Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2006) 12:1
Buffalo Hum Rights Law Rev 57.
9
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“the African Commission has been a disappointment.”12
This disillusionment with the ACHPR led to the idea of an African human rights court being
formally endorsed by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in 1994 in the face
of the Rwandan Genocide and increasing pressure from NGOs and other regional stakeholders
dissatisfied with the state of the African human rights system.13 This set into motion a reform
process that led to the adoption of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights by the 1998
Assembly of Heads of State and Government meeting in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Once it
obtained the requisite fifteen ratifications in 2004, the Protocol entered into force and there are
currently thirty state parties (see Table 1).
The ACtHPR established by the Protocol has contentious jurisdiction in cases brought by the
ACHPR (when a state party has failed to comply with its recommendations or is accused of
“serious or massive” human rights violations), by state parties (when they have been petitioners or
respondents in ACHPR cases or when their nationals have been the victims of human rights
violations), and by intergovernmental organizations.14 Claims may be filed directly with the
ACtHPR by individuals and NGOs only in cases involving states that, in addition to being state
parties, have made the optional declaration accepting ACtHPR jurisdiction in such cases.15
Table 1: State Accession to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
State

Ratified Protocol

Algeria
Angola

2003
⸺

Made Optional
Declaration
⸺
⸺

12

Mutua, supra note 9 at 345.
See Gina Bekker, “The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Safeguarding the Interests of African
States” (2007) 51:1 J Afr Law 151 at 159-69.
14
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (entered into force 25 January 2004) reprinted in OAU/LRG/AFCHPR/PROT (III).
15
Ibid, Art. 34.
13
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Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Central African
Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Côte d’Ivoire
Democratic Republic
of the Congo
Djibouti
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Eswatini
Ethiopia
Gabon
The Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sahrawi Arab
Democratic Republic
São Tomé & Principe
Senegal
Seychelles

2014
⸺
1998
2003
⸺
2014
⸺

2014
⸺
1998
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺

2016
2003
2010
2003
⸺

⸺
⸺
⸺
2013
⸺

⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
2000
1999
2004
⸺
⸺
2004
2003
⸺
2003
⸺
2008
2000
2005
2003
⸺
2004
⸺
2004
2004
2003
2013

⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
2018
2011
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
2008
2010
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
2013†
⸺

⸺
1998
⸺

⸺
⸺
⸺
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Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
South Sudan
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
†

⸺
⸺
2002
⸺
⸺
2006
2003
2007
2001
⸺
⸺

⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
2010
⸺
2017
⸺
⸺
⸺

Withdrawn in 2016

Table 2: ACtHPR Decisions Involving Optional Declaration States
Responsible
on all counts

State
Benin
Burkina Faso
Côte d’Ivoire†
The Gambia
Ghana
Malawi
Mali
Rwanda
Tanzania
Tunisia†
TOTAL
†

Responsible
on some
counts, not
responsible
on others
No. of Cases No. of Cases
(%)
(%)
⸺
1 (100.0)
⸺
2 (100.0)
1 (50.0)
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
1 (20.0)
⸺
⸺
1 (20.0)
4 (16.0)
16 (64.0)
⸺
⸺
6 (13.95)
20 (46.51)

Not
responsible
on all counts

Dismissed on
procedural
TOTAL
grounds

No. of Cases
(%)
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
3 (12.0)
⸺
3 (6.98)

No. of Cases
(%)
⸺
⸺
1 (50.0)
⸺
1 (100.0)
2 (100.0)
4 (80.0)
4 (80.0)
2 (8.0)
⸺
14 (32.56)

No. of Cases
1
2
2
⸺
1
2
5
5
25
⸺
43

Excludes cases dismissed for lack of jurisdiction prior to optional declaration
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Table 3: ACtHPR Decisions Involving Other States
Responsible
on all counts

State
Algeria
Cameroon
Côte d’Ivoire
Gabon
Libya
Kenya
Morocco
Mozambique
Nigeria
Senegal
South Africa
Sudan
Tunisia
TOTAL
1
2

Responsible
on some
counts, not
responsible
on others
No. of Cases No. of Cases
(%)
(%)
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
1
1 (50.0)
⸺
⸺
1 (100.0)2
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
⸺
1 (7.14)
1 (7.14)

Not
responsible
on all counts

Dismissed on
procedural
TOTAL
grounds

No. of Cases No. of Cases
(%)
(%)
⸺
1 (100.0)
⸺
1 (100.0)1
⸺
1 (100.0)
⸺
1 (100.0)
⸺
1 (50.0)2
⸺
⸺
⸺
1 (100.0)
⸺
1 (100.0)
⸺
1 (100.0)1
⸺
1 (100.0)
⸺
2 (100.0)
⸺
1 (100.0)
⸺
1 (100.0)
⸺
12 (85.71)

No. of Cases
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
14

Petition filed jointly against Cameroon and Nigeria
Referred by the ACHPR

Despite the Protocol entering into force in 2004, the ACtHPR was not constituted until 2006,
did not begin receiving cases until 2008, and did not issue its first judgment until 2009, declaring
a petition against Senegal, which has not made the optional declaration allowing individuals and
NGOs direct access, inadmissible.16 As of the summer of 2019, fifty-seven final judgments have
been delivered in contentious cases. However, twenty-six of these judgments have been dismissals
for lack of jurisdiction. Most of these dismissals have been due either to the failure of the
respondent state to make the declaration or the failure of the petitioner to exhaust local remedies.

16

Michelot Yogogombaye v. Republic of Senegal, Judgment, Afr Ct Hum Peoples’ Rts (15 December 2009).
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The large number of dismissals reflects the limited access to the ACtHPR granted individuals and
NGOs and the ACHPR’s reluctance to refer cases to the ACtHPR (there have only been three
referrals in the history of the ACtHPR). Thus, in only thirty-one cases has the ACtHPR reached
the merits of the case. The ACtHPR has also issued precautionary measures in twenty-six cases
as well as six advisory opinions.
In sum, despite the large number of state parties, the ACtHPR’s record thus far illustrates that
direct applications pursuant to optional declarations are the primary means of bringing cases before
the court. Indeed, all but two of the thirty-one cases in which final judgments on the merits have
been rendered came before the ACtHPR as a result of direct applications by individuals and/or
NGOs (see Tables 2 and 3). Thus, being held accountable for human rights violations by the
ACtHPR still remains more theory than reality for most of the twenty states that have ratified the
Protocol but declined to make the declaration.
However, the AU’s responses to two 2011 crises, the violent suppression of political dissent
first in Côte d’Ivoire and then in Libya and the destructive internal conflicts that followed, did
appear to have “unfrozen the [Commission’s] concern about referring cases” to the ACtHPR for
some time.17

By immediately suspending Côte d’Ivoire’s membership and by calling for

Moammar Gaddafi to step aside and permit a transition to democracy, the AU sent a powerful
message that state sovereignty was no longer paramount and that the AU would play a more active
role in promoting democratization and human rights than did its predecessor the OAU.18 This was
followed by the ACHPR referring three cases in succession to the ACtHPR. The first of these

17

Karen J. Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2014) at 152.
18
See “African Union Suspends Ivory Coast over Disputed Poll” (9 December 2010), online: BBC
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11963694>; Kareem Fahim, “Truce Plan for Libya is Rejected by Rebels”
(12 April 2011), online: New York Times <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/world/africa/12libya.html>.
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(and the ACHPR’s first ever referral) came later in 2011 in response to the events in Libya and
resulted in a swift order for provisional measures.19 This was followed by the 2012 referral of a
dispute between Kenya and an indigenous community displaced from its ancestral lands and the
2013 referral of the case of Saif Gaddafi, both of which resulted in judgments against the states
concerned.20
Yet despite this turn, the supply of cases from the ACHPR has since dried up once again. There
are a number of reasons why this has been the case. One is the fact that the ACHPR is an institution
that has historically been rather deferential to states and “subservient to the political machinery of
the OAU/AU.”21

Another is the fact that most cases of non-compliance with ACHPR

recommendations during this period have involved states that have not ratified the ACtHPR
Protocol. Since the ACtHPR opened for business, Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe have all flouted ACHPR recommendations
but as non-state parties their cases could not be referred.22 Furthermore, the fact that “[t]here is…a
certain competition” between the two institutions due to their overlapping functions may have
made the ACHPR reluctant to refer cases of non-compliance that do involve state parties.23 This
has been compounded by the lack of formal guidance provided by the AU to the ACHPR and
ACtHPR regarding their relationship and how they should coordinate.24 The ACHPR’s reluctance
to refer cases may also be driven by fear of having its findings reversed by the ACtHPR, whose

African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Great Socialist Peoples’ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Order
for Provisional Measures, Afr Ct Hum Peoples’ Rts (25 March 2011).
20
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Republic of Kenya, supra note 2; African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Libya, Judgment, Afr Ct Hum Peoples’ Rts (3 June 2016).
21
Bekker, supra note 13 at 171.
22
See Manisuli Ssenyonjo, “Responding to Human Rights Violations in Africa: Assessing the Role of the African
Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1987-2018)” (2018) 7:1 Int Hum Rights Law Rev 1 at 38.
23
Katrin N. Metcalf & Ioannis F. Papageorgiou, “Regional Courts as Judicial Brakes?” (2017) 10:2 Balt J Law Polit
154 at 166.
24
See Rachel Murray & Debra Long, The Implementation of the Findings of the African Commission on Humanand
Peoples’ Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) at 140-61.
19
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review of cases is de novo.25

3

Understanding State Accession to International Human Rights Regimes

Given the ACtHPR’s reliance upon optional declarations for most of its caseload, what can the
creation of other international human rights regimes tell us about the states most likely to provide
further declarations? One of the most influential paradigms for understanding why some states
accept the sovereignty costs associated with international human rights regimes while others do
not is the “lock in” thesis. Most prominently articulated by Andrew Moravcsik in a case study of
the creation of the European human rights system, the “lock in” thesis asserts that the strongest
support for international human rights regimes will come not from established democracies but
rather from transitional states seeking to use membership in such regimes as a way of “locking in”
new (and potentially vulnerable) domestic commitments to democracy and human rights.
The 1950 negotiation of the European human rights system provides support for this notion
given that newly reestablished democracies with recent experience with fascism (such as Austria,
West Germany, and Italy) were the strongest proponents of allowing individuals to bring claims
directly against states in a system of mandatory and binding jurisdiction (while established
democracies were generally more skeptical).

26

This is explained by the fact that for new

democracies the sovereignty costs of a more powerful system were outweighed by the benefits of
protecting unstable institutions against internal subversion while for established democracies there
was less incentive to accept these costs given that democratic stability was already high.27

25

See Ssenyonjo, supra note 22.
Andrew Moravcsik, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe” (2000)
54:2 Int Organ 217.
27
Ibid. See also Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Why States Create International Tribunals: A
Response to Professors Posner and Yoo” (2005) 93:3 Calif Law Rev 899; Beth A. Simmons & Allison Danner,
“Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court” (2010) 64:2 Int Organ 225; Simon Zschirnt & Mark
Menaldo, “International Insurance? Democratic Consolidation and Support for International Human Rights
Regimes” (2014) 8:3 Int J Transit Just 452.
26
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Realist scholars also emphasize the role of self-interest in the rise of international human rights
regimes. However, they differ insofar as they maintain that the strongest proponents of these
regimes will not be transitional states but rather global superpowers, which use these regimes to
project power over other states. That is, realists maintain that just as international law serves as a
means by which strong states impose their norms and values on weak states and protect their own
interests, the same is also true of international human rights regimes.28 For example, Donnelly’s
analysis of the creation of the Inter-American human rights system attributes it largely to “power,
particularly the dominant power of the United States.”29 Having “for whatever reasons…decided
that a regional regime with relatively strong monitoring powers was desirable” (perhaps as a means
of promoting regional stability), the United States “exercised its hegemonic power to ensure its
creation and support its operation.”

30

The result has been a system in which the United States

enjoys a uniquely privileged position of having permanent representation on both the InterAmerican court and commission despite having neither accepted the jurisdiction of the court nor
ratified the American Convention on Human Rights.
Other scholars have maintained that the rise of international human rights regimes primarily
demonstrates the power of international norms. This has often been conceptualized as a “norm
cascade” in which the embrace of a norm by a critical mass of states makes the remaining states
see compliance as an inherent part of membership in good standing in the international
community.31 This may be achieved through diplomatic, economic, and/or military pressure or

28

See e.g. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Jack Donnelly,
“International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis” (1986) 40:3 Int Organ 599; Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and
Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004).
29
Donnelly, supra note 28 at 625.
30
Ibid.
31
Ellen L. Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, “International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America” (2000) 54:3
Int Organ 633 at 638; See also Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change” (1998) 52:4 Intl Organ 887.
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through internalization of the norm via processes of globalization.32 One notable example of this
is state accession to the Convention Against Torture, as Jay Goodliffe and Darren Hawkins’
analysis finds that states became more likely to sign/ratify the Convention as the percentage of
other states in their geographic region that had signed/ratified increased.33
However, the ability of norms to drive the expansion of international human rights regimes is
undoubtedly affected by the strength of states’ domestic rights protections. States with stronger
protections have unsurprisingly been the most willing to accede to international human rights
regimes because of their lower compliance costs, which previous scholarship has shown strongly
affect (except in cases where enforcement mechanisms are weak) the likelihood of accession.34
These more liberal states can reap the reputational and other benefits of accession while making
few, if any, policy changes. States’ assessments of compliance costs may also be affected by the
extent to which the procedures of the courts created by international human rights regimes are
similar to those of their own domestic courts. For example, states with civil law legal systems
have been significantly more likely than states with common law legal systems to submit to the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, whose procedures largely mirror those of a civil
law court.35
Scholars taking an ideational perspective maintain, however, that this is not the entire story

See e.g. Harold H. Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” (1997) 106:8 Yale Law J 2599; Thomas
Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, “Socialization of International Human Rights Norms Into Domestic Practices” in Thomas
Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic
Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 1-38; Brian Greenhill, “The Company You Keep:
International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms” (2010) 54:1 Int Stud Quart 127.
33
Jay Goodliffe & Darren G. Hawkins, “Explaining Commitment: States and the Convention Against Torture”
(2006) 68:2 J Polit 358 at 366.
34
See Oona A. Hathaway, “The Cost of Commitment” (2003) 55:5 Stanford Law Rev 1821; “Why Do States
Commit to Human Rights Treaties?” (2007) 51:4 J Conflict Resolut 588.
35
Emilia J. Powell & Sara M. Mitchell, “The International Court of Justice and the World’s Three Legal Systems”
(2007) 69:2 J Polit 397; Domestic Law Goes Global: Legal Traditions and International Court (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 129-63.
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and that the greater willingness of these states to commit also reflects principled commitment to
safeguarding and exporting their liberal values. Indeed, some scholars have provided evidence of
such commitments transcending states’ own material interests, such as, for example, the surprising
number of states with close economic, military, and political ties to the United States that refused
to sign bilateral agreements not to surrender Americans to the International Criminal Court
(ICC).36 Further evidence that ideational factors have been critical to the rise of international
human rights regimes can be found in the significant differences in the postures of states governed
by leftist versus rightist parties. For example, during the negotiation of the Rome Statute, states
governed by leftist parties were significantly more likely to take positions that would have
established a more powerful and independent ICC.37
Analysis of the effects of these various factors upon the likelihood of ratification of the
ACtHPR Protocol has provided substantial support for the “lock in” thesis as well as some support
for other theories of the origins of international human rights regimes. Most notably, the
relationship between democratization and the likelihood of ratification has not been a positive
linear relationship but rather a curvilinear relationship. That is, it has not been the most democratic
AU member states but rather those at intermediate levels of democratization (most of which have
relatively recently transitioned to more democratic modes of governance) that have been the most
likely to ratify.38 Indeed, a surprising number of the continent’s strongest and most stable
democracies, including states such as Botswana and Namibia (two of only three African states that
have been continuously democratic since independence), have yet to ratify. This is underscored

Judith Kelley, “Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral
Surrender Agreements” (2007) 101:3 Am Polit Sci Rev 573.
37
Jay Goodliffe & Darren G Hawkins, “A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Rome: Explaining International
Criminal Court Negotiations” (2009) 71:3 J Polit 977 at 991; Zschirnt & Menaldo, supra note 27 at 467.
38
Simon Zschirnt, “Locking in Human Rights in Africa: Analyzing State Accession to the African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights” (2018) 19:1 Hum Rights Rev 97 at 112.
36
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by the fact that recent transitions to full democracy and out of autocracy have both been significant
positive predictors of ratifications, as has been past experience of genocide or politicide.39 There
is also evidence that compliance costs have mattered as states scoring higher on human rights
indices and states with fewer armed internal conflicts have been more likely to ratify.40
Furthermore, as would be expected given the similarities between the ACtHPR’s procedures and
those of a common law court, states with common law legal systems have also been significantly
more likely to ratify.41 There is also evidence of the influence of ideational factors as states
governed by leftist parties have also been more likely to ratify.42 Finally, there was no evidence
of the type of power dynamics postulated by realists as there was no difference in the willingness
of large and small states to ratify.43
However, given the lack of direct access conferred by the ACtHPR Protocol and the ACHPR’s
reluctance to refer cases to the ACtHPR, there is reason to believe that the dynamics of optional
declarations may differ significantly from the dynamics of ratifications of the Protocol. Whereas
ratifying the Protocol has proven to be a largely cost-free, symbolic commitment, taking the further
step of making the optional declaration represents a far more significant and potentially costly
commitment. Thus, the following section analyzes the circumstances surrounding the ten
declarations and the conclusions that can be drawn from them.

4

Analyzing Optional Declarations

Comparing as groups states that made the optional declaration and states that ratified the ACtHPR
Protocol but did not make the declaration reveals a few potentially significant differences. First,

39

Ibid.
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
40
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some of the same factors that have distinguished states that have ratified the Protocol from states
that have not ratified have also distinguished states that have made the declaration from states that
have ratified the Protocol but not made the declaration. Most noteworthy are compliance costs.
States making the declaration scored slightly higher on average on democratization and human
rights indices than states ratifying the Protocol but not simultaneously making the declaration. In
particular, optional declaration states scored higher on average on both the Polity democratization
index and the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Empowerment Rights Index (which measures the
incidence of violations of rights to electoral self-determination and freedom of assembly,
association, movement, religion, and speech).

The respective average scores of optional

declaration states at the time of their declarations were 3 and 9 while the respective average scores
of ratification only states at the time of their ratifications were 1 and 7. 44

There was, however, no difference in the two groups of states’ average scores on the CIRI Physical Integrity
Rights Index (which measures the incidence of human rights violations such as disappearance, extrajudicial killing,
and torture). The average score of both groups was a 4. This was not unexpected given that Physical Integrity Rights
Index scores have also not been a significant predictor of ratifications of the Protocol.
44
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Table 4: Characteristics of Optional Declaration States
State
(Year)

Polity
Score1

Physical
Integrity
Rights
Score2

Empowerment
Rights
Score3

Armed
Internal
Conflicts

New
Democracy

Recent
Autocracy

Forcible
Regime
Changes

Genocides
/
Politicides

Executive
Party
Ideology

Legal
System

Region

Benin
(2014)
Burkina
Faso
(1998)
Côte
d’Ivoire
(2013)
The
Gambia
(2018)
Ghana
(2011)
Malawi
(2008)
Mali
(2010)
Rwanda
(2013)
Tanzania
(2010)
Tunisia
(2017)

7

N/A4

N/A4

⸺

No

No

5

⸺

N/A5

⸺4

4

10

⸺

No

Yes

5

⸺

Right

Civil
Law
Civil
Law

West
Africa
West
Africa

4

N/A4

N/A4

2

No

No

1

⸺

N/A5

Civil
Law

West
Africa

4

N/A4

N/A4

⸺

No

No

1

⸺

Left

Common
Law

West
Africa

8

4

11

⸺

No

No

5

⸺

Left

6

4

8

⸺

Yes

No

⸺

⸺

Right

7

5

11

1

No

No

1

⸺

N/A5

⸺3

N/A4

N/A4

2

No

No

1

2

N/A5

⸺1

5

7

⸺

No

No

⸺

⸺

Left

7

N/A4

N/A4

⸺

Yes

No

1

⸺

Left

Common
Law
Common
Law
Civil
Law
Civil
Law
Common
Law
Civil
Law

West
Africa
Southern
Africa
West
Africa
East
Africa
East
Africa
North
Africa

Possible scores range from ⸺10 to 10
Possible scores range from 0 to 8
3
Possible scores range from 0 to 14
4
Scores only available through 2011
5
Centrist party or independent executive
1
2
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Thus, states making the declaration have been a self-selected group of somewhat more
democratic and liberal states for whom greater exposure to mandatory and binding human rights
litigation before the ACtHPR poses fewer difficulties. On the other hand, the “lock in” factor
appears, at least at first glance, to have been less of a driving force behind declarations than
ratifications. For example, there have been relatively fewer new democracies (defined as fully
democratic states [i.e. states with a Polity score of 6 or higher in a given country-year] that had
transitioned to democracy within the past ten years) and/or recent autocracies (defined as nonautocratic states [i.e. states with a Polity score of —5 or higher in a given country-year] that had
transitioned out of autocracy within the past ten years) among the states making the declaration.
Of the ten declarations, only two (20%) were made by states that were new democracies at the
time (Malawi and Tunisia) and only one (10%) was made by a state that was a recent autocracy at
the time (Burkina Faso). In contrast, of the twenty-seven cases of states ratifying the Protocol but
not simultaneously making the declaration, seven (25%) involved new democracies and eleven
(41%) involved recent autocracies. This reflects the fact that in most cases declarations were not
made until several years after states took the initial step of ratifying the Protocol. While three
states (Benin, Burkina Faso, and Malawi) made the declaration immediately upon ratifying the
Protocol, the other seven optional declaration states waited an average of ten years to do so.
However, in most cases it was not subsequent positive change in those states’ human rights
situations that led them to take the further step of making the declaration but rather consolidation
and stabilization. Only in the Gambia and Tunisia was there dramatic improvement in the human
rights situation in the years between ratification and declaration.

In the Gambia, military

intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) forced the end of
the authoritarian regime of Yahya Jammeh in 2017 after his refusal to concede defeat in the
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presidential election, eighteen years after the Gambia’s 1999 ratification of the Protocol. In
Tunisia, the “Arab Spring” swept out the authoritarian regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in 2011,
four years after Tunisia’s 2007 ratification of the Protocol. In contrast, there was little, if any,
change in the human rights situations of Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Rwanda, and Tanzania in the
years between their ratifications and their declarations (although Côte d’Ivoire’s declaration was
made shortly after the 2010-11 Ivorian crisis, a civil war that saw massive human rights violations).
The Ivorian crisis notwithstanding, optional declaration states have also, in a similar vein, been
generally less likely to have experienced significant civil strife.

In particular, they have

experienced more than a third fewer armed internal conflicts on average. Specifically, whereas
the twenty-seven states that ratified the Protocol but did not simultaneously make the declaration
had experienced an average of 0.88 armed internal conflicts at the time of their ratifications, the
ten declarations were made by states that had experienced an average of only 0.50 such conflicts
at the time of their declarations (see Table 4). Given that recurrences of civil conflict threaten state
parties with significant compliance costs, this is not surprising.
Optional declaration states have also been somewhat less likely to have experienced genocides
or politicides. Rwanda, which in 2016 became the only state to withdraw its declaration, is the
only one of the ten states with such experience. In contrast, past experience of genocide or
politicide has been a significant positive predictor of ratifications. Around 20% of the states that
ratified the Protocol but did not simultaneously make the declaration had experienced at least one
genocide or politicide at the time of their ratification.45

45

There was, however, no difference between the two groups of states on other measures of political instability,
such as the number of forcible regime changes (i.e. coups d’etat, executive auto-coups, etc.) experienced. Just as the
twenty-seven states that ratified the Protocol but did not simultaneously make the declaration had experienced an
average of 2 forcible regime changes at the time of their ratifications, the ten declarations were made by states that
had experienced an average of 2 such regime changes at the time of their declarations. This was also not unexpected
given that forcible regime changes have not been a significant predictor of ratifications of the Protocol.
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Finally, with regard to other factors that have also been significant drivers of ratifications, there
has been little or no difference between optional declaration states and states that have ratified the
Protocol but not made the declaration. In particular, optional declaration states have not been
significantly more or less likely to be governed by leftist parties. 35% of the states that ratified
the Protocol but did not simultaneously make the declaration were governed by leftist parties at
the time of their ratifications whereas four of the ten states making the declaration (40%) did so
under leftist governments.
Similarly, differences in domestic legal systems also appear not to have been a major factor.
40% of the ten optional declaration states and 30% of the twenty states that have ratified the
Protocol but not made the declaration are states with common law legal systems. However, given
the relatively small number of optional declaration states, there are limits to the inferences that can
be drawn from such comparisons. What follows therefore are more in depth analyses of the
situations in each of the ten optional declaration states at the time of their declarations.

4.1 Benin
Benin’s 2014 declaration (which occurred the same year as its ratification of the Protocol)
happened well into a lengthy period of democratic stability and liberalisation. Since the ratification
of its 1990 constitution, which jettisoned Marxism-Leninism as the official state ideology and
provides for a multi-party democracy, Benin has been among Africa’s most democratic and
politically stable countries. It has held six consecutive national elections that have been considered
free and fair and enjoys an independent judiciary, a free and diverse media, and a flourishing civil
society.46 Consequently, it has consistently scored highly on various governance indices, ranking

See Bruce A. Magnusson, “Democratization and Domestic Insecurity: Navigating the Transition in Benin” (2001)
33:2 Comp Polit 211; Thomas Bierschenk, “Democratization without Development: Benin 1989-2009” (2009) 22:3
Int J Polit Cult Soc 337.
46
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in the top ten in the categories of rule of law and participation/human rights in the most recent
Ibrahim Index of African Governance.47 With no political prisoners and without the large-scale
ethnic violence that has plagued other African states, it perhaps is not surprising that the ACtHPR
did not adjudicate the merits of a case brought against Benin until 2019. Benin’s initial disinterest
in the ACtHPR (waiting until 2014 to ratify the 1998 ACtHPR Protocol) is thus consistent with
the disinterest shown by many of the continent’s other relatively established democracies.
However, it is noteworthy in light of the “lock in” thesis that the stable liberal democracy that the
country has enjoyed for the past twenty-nine years followed thirty years of extreme instability and
repression that earned it the moniker “enfant malade de l’Afrique.”48

Following its 1960

independence from France, Benin experienced five coups d’etat in less than twelve years, the last
of which ushered in eighteen years of autocratic rule by Mathieu Kérékou, who established a oneparty Marxist regime and placed all economic activity under state control.49
It is also noteworthy that Benin was the fifth ECOWAS member state to make the declaration
(following its neighbors Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Mali), and that the six ECOWAS
member states that have now made the declaration (the aforementioned five plus the Gambia) now
comprise a majority of the states that have done so (and more than a third of ECOWAS’s total
membership). The particular willingness of ECOWAS member states to submit themselves to the
ACtHPR’s jurisdiction likely reflects the increasing activism of the ECOWAS Court of Justice,
especially in the area of human rights. Established in 1991 to adjudicate disputes arising from

Mo Ibrahim Foundation, “2018 Ibrahim Index of African Governance Index Report” (17 October 2018), online
(pdf): <https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2018/10/28183452/2018-IndexReport.pdf?_ga=2.61673836.1958465812.1541020228-40382193.1541020228>.
48
Bierschenk, supra note 46 at 348.
49
See e.g. Chris Allen, “‘Goodbye to All That:’ The Short and Sad Story of Socialism in Benin” (1992) 8:2 J
Communist Stud 63; “Reconstructing an Authoritarian State: ‘Democratic Renewal’ in Benin” (1992) 54:1 Rev Afr
Polit Econ 42; Patrick Claffey, “Kérékou the Chameleon, Master of Myth” in Julia C. Strauss and Donal C. O’Brien,
Staging Politics: Power and Performance in Asia and Africa (New York: I.B. Taurus & Co., 2007) at 91-110.
47
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ECOWAS treaties and regional integration programs, the ECOWAS Court of Justice was not
formally constituted until 2001 and had a relatively minimal caseload until a supplemental protocol
expanded its jurisdiction to include human rights in 2005. 50 This human rights jurisdiction is
noteworthy for its breadth insofar as not only does it grant direct access to the Court to individuals,
this access is not contingent upon the exhaustion of domestic remedies and claims may be based
upon any human rights instrument that the state concerned has ratified.51 Consequently, human
rights claims now comprise the vast majority of the Court’s caseload.52 It is therefore not
surprising that states that already have even broader exposure to international human rights
litigation as ECOWAS members would be more likely to allow direct access to the ACtHPR.
Furthermore, the disproportionate number of ECOWAS member states among the states allowing
direct access to the ACtHPR appears likely to increase rather than decrease as Liberia and Sierra
Leone have both recently indicated their willingness to ratify the Protocol and simultaneously
make the optional declaration.53
That the ECOWAS Court of Justice has been allowed to develop in this way has been attributed
to a number of factors, most notably the strengthening of ECOWAS and its institutional credibility
following military interventions under ECOWAS auspices that ended civil wars in Côte d’Ivoire,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.54 Thus, whereas regional dynamics have obstructed

50

Supplementary Protocol A/SP1/01/05 Amending the Preamble and Articles 1, 2, 9, 22, and 30 of Protocol
A/P.1/7/91 Relating to the Community Court of Justice and Article 4 Paragraph 1 of the English Version of the Said
Protocol (adopted 19 January 2005).
51
Ibid, Art 3.
52
See e.g. Solomon T. Ebobrah, “Critical Issues in the Human Rights Mandate of the ECOWAS Court of
Justice”(2010) 54:1 J Afr Law 1; Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Jacqueline R. McAllister, “A New
International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice” (2013) 107:4 Am J
Int Law 737; Karen J. Alter, James T. Gathii & Laurence R. Helfer, “Backlash Against International Courts in West,
East, and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences” (2016) 27:2 Eur J Int Law 293.
53
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, “Sierra Leone and Liberia Express Willingness to Ratify the
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54
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ratifications of the ACtHPR Protocol in some regions, they have facilitated them in others. For
example, other factors being equal, Southern African states have been significantly less likely to
ratify, reflecting the backlash against the regional Southern African Development Community
Tribunal’s decision favoring expropriated white Zimbabwean farmers that caused it to be
disbanded in 2012. 55 However, regional dynamics appear to have facilitated optional declarations
in West Africa. Indeed, there is some indication of the sort of “cascade” effect seen in other
contexts since Mali, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Benin’s declarations all occurred within a period
of four years.

4.2

Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso’s 1998 declaration was the first by any state, occurring only a month after Burkina
Faso successfully hosted the OAU summit at which the ACtHPR Protocol was adopted. Indeed,
for the next ten years Burkina Faso remained the only state that had made the declaration (although
this was something of a moot point given that the ACtHPR did not begin receiving cases until
2008). However, despite its early accession, Burkina Faso was one of the more atypical of the
states making the optional declaration as its declaration occurred near the midpoint of a lengthy
spell of non-democratic governance. In 1998, the country was in only the eleventh year of Blaise
Compaoré’s twenty-seven year presidency. Having organized a bloody 1987 coup d’etat in which
President Thomas Sankara was murdered, Compaoré shared power as part of a triumvirate for two
years before executing the other two triumvirate members following an alleged 1989 coup attempt.
Although Compaoré subsequently won presidential elections in 1991 and 1998, these were
boycotted by the major opposition parties in protest of the means by which Compaoré had seized

See Alter, Gathii & Helfer, supra note 52 at 306-14; Shane Meckler, “A Human Rights ‘Monster’ That Devoured
No One: The Far-Reaching Impact of Dismantling the SADC Tribunal” (2016) 48:3 NYU J Int Law Pol 1007;
Zschirnt, supra note 38.
55
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power. Compaoré’s 2005 and 2010 victories over a divided opposition were also accompanied by
allegations of massive fraud.56
Notably however, the 1998 declaration did occur amidst significant liberalisation of the
regime. Although elections remained one-sided and marred by low turnout, the repression of civil
society began to wane in the 1990s as the regime evolved from a military dictatorship into a
“competitive authoritarian regime.”57 For example, between 1987 and 1997 Burkina Faso’s score
on the Empowerment Rights Index rose from a 5 (a score identical to recent scores received by
authoritarian states such as, for example, Kuwait, Rwanda, and Tajikistan) to a 12 (a score identical
to recent scores received by established democracies such as, for example, Canada, Japan, and
Sweden). Ironically, this liberalisation would ultimately pave the way for Compaoré’s ouster in
2014. NGOs and opposition parties spearheaded the nationwide protests that forced his resignation
after he attempted to amend the country’s constitution to allow him to run for reelection to a fifth
term.58
Nonetheless, despite being the first state to make the optional declaration, it was not until
the decision of two cases in 2014 that this resulted in the condemnation of Burkinabé human rights
violations by the ACtHPR, underscoring the ACtHPR’s relatively small docket and its slow pace
of adjudication. In its decision in Abdoulaye Nikiema et al. v. Burkina Faso, the ACtHPR
condemned the Burkinabé government’s failure to adequately investigate the murder of an

See e.g. Carlos Santiso & Augustin Loada, “Explaining the Unexpected: Electoral Reform and Democratic
Governance in Burkina Faso” (2003) 41:3 J Mod Afr Stud 395; Christophe Châtelot, “Burkina Faso’s President Is in
a League of his Own” (30 November 2010), online: The Guardian
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/30/burkina-faso>; Simon Gongo & Nicky Smith, “Burkina Faso
Votes as Compaoré Seeks his Fourth Term” (21 November 2010), online: Bloomberg
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-11-21/burkina-faso-votes-as-compaore-seeks-fourth-termupdate1->.
57
Santiso & Loada, supra note 56 at 399. See also Ernest Harsch, “Burkina Faso in the Winds of Liberalisation”
(1998) 25:4 Rev Afr Polit Econ 625.
58
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online: BBC News < https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29858965>.
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investigative journalist while in its decision in Lohé Issa Konaté v. Burkina Faso, the ACtHPR
declared that Burkinabé law criminalizing the defamation of government officials violates the right
to freedom of expression.59

4.3

Côte d’Ivoire

Côte d’Ivoire’s 2013 declaration was one that is consistent with the “lock in” thesis since it was
closely linked to a new political beginning. In particular, it occurred less than two years after the
end of the 2010-11 Ivorian crisis. Following the refusal of President Laurent Gbagbo to concede
defeat in the country’s disputed 2010 presidential election, violent clashes broke out between
government security forces and supporters of opposition candidate Alassane Ouattara. This
triggered an immediate international response, with the AU suspending Côte d’Ivoire’s
membership, ECOWAS threatening military intervention, and the United Nations Security
Council adopting a resolution condemning the violence and recognizing Ouattara as the country’s
legitimate president. It also precipitated the collapse of a tenuous peace agreement that had ended
five years of ethnically and religiously charged civil war in 2007 and to the rebel forces now allied
with Ouattara renewing armed hostilities and marching south on the country’s capital from their
northern strongholds.
The resulting four month conflict killed more than 3,000 Ivorians and ended with a rebel
victory (aided by French and United Nations intervention), the capture of President Gbagbo, and
Gbagbo’s extradition to face charges filed by the International Criminal Court.60 Charged with

Abdoulaye Nikiema et al. v. Burkina Faso, Judgment, Afr Ct Hum Peoples’ Rts (28 March 2014); Lohé Issa
Konaté v. Burkina Faso, Judgment, Afr Ct Hum Peoples’ Rts (5 December 2014).
60
See e.g. Thomas J. Bassett & Scott Straus, “Defending Democracy in Côte d’Ivoire: Africa Takes a Stand” (2011)
90:4 Foreign Aff 130; David Zounmenou, “Côte d’Ivoire’s Post-Electoral Conflict: What Is at Stake?”(2011) 20:1
Afr Security Rev 48; Mohamed A. El Khawas & Julius N. Anyu, “Côte d’Ivoire: Ethnic Turmoil and Foreign
Intervention” (2014) 61:2 Afr Today 41.
59
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crimes against humanity in connection with murders, rapes, and other atrocities allegedly
committed by government security forces following the election, Gbagbo was the first head of
state to be tried by the ICC.61 He was ultimately acquitted in 2019.
The optional declaration allowing Ivorians direct access to the ACtHPR was but one of
several human rights initiatives that were subsequently undertaken early in Ouattara’s presidency
to signal a clear break with the abuses of the Gbagbo regime. These also included further
cooperation with the ICC, extraditing not only Gbagbo but also pro-Gbagbo militia leader Charles
Blé Goudé following his capture in 2013. They also included the 2011 establishment of a special
commission of inquiry to investigate and document human rights violations committed by both
sides during the Ivorian crisis and of a special taskforce of judges and prosecutors, the Special
Investigative and Examination Cell, charged with prosecuting crimes committed in the conflict.62
Making the declaration was thus clearly part of a broader effort to enhance the credibility
of a new regime accused of having committed its own widespread human rights violations against
pro-Gbagbo forces both during and after the crisis. 63 It also opened the door to one of the
ACtHPR’s most significant decisions applying human rights instruments other than the Charter.
In its 2016 decision in Actions pour la Protection des Droits de l’Homme v. Republic of Côte
d’Ivoire, its only merits decision involving Côte d’Ivoire thus far, the ACtHPR concluded that
Côte d’Ivoire’s national electoral commission violated its obligation under the African Charter on
Democracy, Elections, and Governance and the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good
Governance to establish an independent and impartial election authority (due to the fact that the

See International Justice Monitor, “Laurent Koudou Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé at the International Criminal
Court,” online: < https://www.ijmonitor.org/category/laurent-koudou-gbagbo-charles-ble-goude/>
62
See Human Rights Watch, “‘They Killed Them Like It Was Nothing:’ The Need for Justice for Côte d’Ivoire’s
Post-Election Crimes” (5 October 2011), online: < https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/10/05/they-killed-them-it-wasnothing/need-justice-cote-divoires-post-election-crimes>.
63
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commission was staffed largely by functionaries of the governing party).64

4.4

The Gambia

The Gambia’s 2018 declaration is the most recent and one that, like Côte d’Ivoire’s, provides
support for the “lock in” thesis as it was closely linked to a new political beginning. In this case,
the declaration was made less than two years after the 2017 removal from power of President
Yahya Jammeh via an ECOWAS military intervention. Following the country’s 2016 presidential
election, Jammeh, who had ruled the Gambia for twenty-two years, first as the leader of a military
junta and then as a four-term elected president, initially conceded defeat to Adama Barrow.
However, a week later, following the release of revised results that showed a narrower margin of
defeat (and calls by some opposition leaders for him to be prosecuted for human rights violations
once he left office), Jammeh retracted his concession, called for a new election to be held, and
declared a state of emergency extending his term. These actions plunged the Gambia into a
constitutional crisis and were internationally condemned by ECOWAS, the AU, and the United
Nations Security Council. Once a January 19, 2017 deadline set by ECOWAS for Jammeh to step
down expired, a multinational ECOWAS force marched into the Gambia largely unopposed (after
the leadership of the Gambian military had declared its support for Barrow) and Jammeh resigned
and went into exile.65 Although the intervention resulted in only a handful of deaths in isolated
clashes, it also triggered an exodus of more than forty thousand Gambians fleeing the unstable

Actions pour la Protection des Droits de l’Homme v. Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Jugement, Afr Ct Hum Peoples’
Rts (18 November 2016).
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85; Claus Kress and Benjamin Nussberger, “Pro-Democratic Intervention in Current International Law: The Case of
The Gambia in January 2017” (2017) 4:2 J Use Force Intl Law 239; Josh Zakharov, “Lessons in Democracy
Promotion from The Gambia’s Constitutional Crisis” (27 February 2017), online:
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political situation for other countries.66
It was in this context that President Barrow attempted to signal the dawn of a new era by
quickly reversing a number of controversial decisions taken by Jammeh. Not only did Barrow
return the Gambia to the Commonwealth of Nations, which Jammeh had withdrawn the country
from in 2013, he also returned the Gambia to the International Criminal Court, which Jammeh had
withdrawn the country from in 2016.67 Rejoining the ICC was but part of a broader human rights
agenda pursued by Barrow that also included releasing all political prisoners detained without trial
by Jammeh, establishing a truth and reconciliation commission, compensating victims of human
rights abuses, and abolishing the death penalty.68
This agenda was framed as a “return from twenty-two years of exile” inflicted by the 1994
military coup that brought Jammeh to power.69

Prior to the coup, the Gambia had since

independence been one of Africa’s most democratic and politically stable states. Although
elections resumed in 1996 following the adoption of a new constitution, these were marred by
significant restrictions on freedom of the press and the widespread use of intimidation, harassment,
and violence against political opponents.70 Making the declaration thus fit in nicely with this

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Senegal: Around 45,000 Have Fled Political Uncertainty in
The Gambia” (20 January 2017), online: <https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2017/1/5881deb74/senegal-around45000-fled-political-uncertainty-gambia.html>.
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<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gambia-politics-idUSKBN16U2ZD>; “Gambia: President Barrow Signs
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project of signaling a break with the abuses of the Jammeh regime and restoring the liberal
democracy that the country once enjoyed.

4.5 Ghana
Ghana’s 2011 declaration fits the same pattern as Benin’s: a declaration occurring after significant
democratic consolidation in a state previously marked by significant instability and repression.
Since the military gave way to a civilian government following the ratification of the country’s
current constitution in 1992, Ghana has developed into one of Africa’s most democratic and
politically stable states.71 It had the highest Polity score of any of the ten optional declaration
states at the time of their declarations and was tied with Mali for the highest Empowerment Rights
Index score. It has also performed extremely well on governance indices like the Ibrahim Index,
ranking in the top ten overall and in the top five in the categories of rule of law and
participation/human rights.72 Thus, Ghana, like Benin, Mali, and Malawi (full democracies with
relatively high scores on CIRI and other human rights indices), faced relatively fewer compliance
costs in making the declaration. Indeed, the ACtHPR has yet to adjudicate the merits of any cases
brought against Ghana. The only finalized case involving Ghana resulted in a declaration of
inadmissibility.
Like nearby Benin, however, Ghana’s current stability belies the unusual instability it
suffered during its first decades of independence. Between 1960 and 1992, the country oscillated
wildly between democracy and dictatorship as five governments were forcibly removed via coups.
Two of these coups (those of 1972 and 1981) ended short-lived experiments in democracy and the

See e.g. Mike Oquaye, “Human Rights and the Transition to Democracy under the PNDC in Ghana” (1995) 17:3
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country was governed largely by a succession of military regimes.73 Indeed, the five coups that
Ghana experienced marked its early history as unstable even by post-colonial African standards.
Only Nigeria and Sierra Leone have experienced more forcible regime changes and only four other
states, including fellow optional declaration states Benin and Burkina Faso, have experienced as
many. Thus, just like in Benin, historical memory may have been a key driver of Ghana’s
willingness to commit.

4.6

Malawi

Malawi’s 2008 declaration (which occurred the same year as its ratification of the Protocol)
represents yet another example of a declaration made by a state that was a full democracy but one
with a significant history of instability and/or repression. However, Malawi’s case differs
somewhat from the cases of Benin, Ghana, and Mali because its declaration occurred during efforts
to correct backsliding that threatened Malawi’s young democracy. In particular, it occurred as
President Bingu wa Mutharika tried to restore confidence following significant backsliding in the
latter years of his predecessor Bakili Muluzi’s tenure.
Having already been elected president twice, Muluzi, Malawi’s first democratically elected
president, precipitated a political crisis in 2002 by proposing a constitutional amendment that
would have permitted him to run for reelection indefinitely. This proved particularly controversial
in a country that had only in 1994 emerged from thirty years of totalitarian rule by “president for
life” Hastings Banda and led to widespread public demonstrations and formal statements of

See e.g. Naomi Chazan, “Planning Democracy in Africa: A Comparative Perspective on Nigeria and Ghana”
(1989) 22:3/4 Policy Sci 325; Jeff Haynes, “Sustainable Democracy in Ghana? Problems and Prospects” (1993) 14:3
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opposition from the legislative and judicial branches.74

After standing down, Muluzi was

succeeded in 2004 by his handpicked successor Mutharika. The latter, in addition to bringing
Malawi into the ACtHPR, pursued legal reforms intended to entrench human rights protections
and the separation of powers. He was also credited with reducing endemic corruption in his first
term (although his second term was widely criticized for undermining the country’s democratic
institutions).75
Despite the fact that Malawi was only the second state to make the declaration and its
declaration has been in force for virtually the entire period that the ACtHPR has been receiving
cases, the ACtHPR has yet to adjudicate the merits of a case brought against Malawi. The two
cases involving Malawi that reached the ACtHPR were dismissed on procedural grounds and there
is only one such case currently pending on the ACtHPR’s docket. This underscores the relative
lack of compliance costs faced thus far by the four more liberal and democratic optional declaration
states.

4.7

Mali

Mali’s 2010 declaration occurred toward the end of a twenty-one year period in which it was one
of Africa’s most democratic and politically stable countries.

Following the nationwide

demonstrations and strikes that toppled Moussa Traorè’s twenty-three-year military dictatorship
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the Game in African Politics” (1995) 94:2 Afr Affairs 227; Stephen Brown, “‘Born-Again Politicians Hijacked Our
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Malawi Who Went from Reformer to Despot” (7 April 2012), online: The Guardian
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in 1991, Mali quickly transformed into a model democracy on par with its fellow ECOWAS
members Benin and Ghana. Four consecutive free and fair national elections followed, alongside
the first peaceful transition of power in the country’s history.76 It was against this backdrop, late
in the second term of President Amadou Toumani Touré, the country’s second democratically
elected president, that Mali became only the third state to make the declaration.
However, two years later the fragility of this democracy would be revealed when Touré was
ousted in a coup d’etat and replaced by a military junta. The coup was triggered by dissatisfaction
among military leaders with Touré’s handling of the secessionist Tuareg Rebellion in northern
Mali, which had ousted government forces from several major cities with the assistance of fighters
from Al Qaeda and other Islamist groups. Although pressure from the AU and ECOWAS (both
of which suspended Mali’s membership), the United Nations Security Council (which adopted a
resolution calling for the military to stand down), and most of the international community quickly
led to a negotiated settlement that restored democracy, the episode illustrated the vulnerability of
even relatively consolidated African democracies to backsliding. 77

4.8

Rwanda

The 1994 Rwandan Genocide, which cost the lives of nearly one million Rwandans, clearly
loomed large in Rwanda’s 2013 declaration. Since toppling the military junta that perpetrated the
genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front government has used memory of the genocide to legitimate
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its increasingly authoritarian rule.78 It has also strategically attempted to cultivate the support of
the international donors needed to rebuild the devastated country through numerous progressive
initiatives, such as the use of gender quotas to achieve the highest representation of women of any
national legislature, the abolition of the death penalty, and support for LGBT rights.79 Supporting
the nascent ACtHPR by becoming only the sixth state to make the declaration thus fits into this
pattern.
However, the fact that Rwanda remains effectively a one-party state in which political
opposition is tightly controlled quickly became a source of tension. By far the least democratic of
the states that have made the declaration and the one with the poorest performance on human rights
indices, compliance costs quickly became unacceptable to Rwanda’s government. Only three
years later and before the ACtHPR had adjudicated even a single case brought against it, Rwanda
became the first (and thus far only) state to withdraw its declaration (although it has not denounced
its ratification of the Protocol). The apparent cause of the withdrawal was the impending
adjudication of a petition filed by Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza, an opposition politician arrested
after giving a speech at the country’s Genocide Memorial Centre that was deemed genocide denial
by the Rwandan government.80 This occurred against the backdrop of increasing international
criticism of the Rwandan government’s use of laws against ethnic “divisionism” and “genocide

See e.g. Filip Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship” (2004) 103:411 Afr Affairs
177; Scott Straus & Lars Waldorf (eds), Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights After Mass Violence
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ideology” to suppress political dissent.81
The official reason provided by the Rwandan government was a different (and ultimately
dismissed) petition that had been filed by a fugitive former senator convicted of genocide that
sought provisional measures enjoining the 2015 referendum on amending the country’s
constitution to allow President Paul Kagame to run for a third term. 82 The Rwandan Ministry of
Justice’s statement on the withdrawal of Rwanda’s declaration declared that it would not stand for
the right of individual application being “exploited by genocide fugitives” who were using it as a
“platform for reinvention and sanitization” of the genocide.83 Although this had no effect upon
claims lodged before the withdrawal (one of which resulted in a finding of responsibility for human
rights violations and several of which are still pending before the ACtHPR), it has severely limited
the ACtHPR’s ability to play any further role in the protection of human rights in Rwanda.

4.9

Tanzania

Tanzania’s 2010 declaration appears to have been driven more by its 2007 selection as the seat of
the ACtHPR than by the political factors that have driven other states’ declarations. Once the AU
made the decision to conserve scarce funding by accepting Tanzania’s offer to house the ACtHPR
in the existing facilities of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, it would have been
untenable for Tanzania to remain outside of the ACtHPR for very long. Thus, whereas declarations
have otherwise tended to be made in contexts of consolidated or consolidating democracies,
Tanzania has been an exception. It remains a one-party dominant state in which the Chama Cha

See Kenneth Roth, “The Power of Horror in Rwanda” (11 April 2009), online:
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Mapinduzi (Party of the Revolution) has held power continuously since 1977 and is the longest
reigning ruling party in Africa. While multi-party elections have been held since 1992, the party
has never received less than 58% of the vote in a presidential election and has consistently enjoyed
legislative supermajorities.84 This grip on power can be attributed at least in part to significant
restrictions on freedom of association and expression, including widespread intimidation of
independent media outlets and suppression of political dissent.85 This is reflected in the country’s
relatively low Polity (─1) and Empowerment Rights Index (7) scores at the time of its declaration,
scores reflecting a situation that has not changed fundamentally in the intervening years.
Given that human rights have thus been somewhat more precarious in Tanzania than in most
of the other states that have made the declaration, it is perhaps not surprising that Tanzania has
become by far the ACtHPR’s most frequent “customer,” with twenty-three of the ACtHPR thirtyone merits decisions coming in cases involving Tanzania. This has also been driven by geographic
proximity since the ACtHPR’s location in Arusha means that there are fewer barriers to
Tanzanians filing claims than there are to residents of other optional declaration states filing
claims, not to mention the greater awareness of the ACtHPR and its work that exists in Tanzania.86
Most importantly, Tanzania’s unique exposure to ACtHPR litigation has the potential to force
change in its political system as some of the ACtHPR’s decisions involving Tanzania have
condemned laws used to perpetuate one-party dominance, such as its decision condemning

See e.g. Kevin Croke, “Tools of Single Party Hegemony in Tanzania: Evidence from Surveys and Survey
Experiments” (2017) 24:2 Democratization 189; Yonatan L. Morse, “Party Matters: The Institutional Origins of
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Tanzania’s ban on independent electoral candidacies.87

The ACtHPR ordering provisional

measures staying the executions of several Tanzanian prisoners facing death sentences has also
roiled Tanzanian politics.88 Moreover, a look at the cases pending on the ACtHPR’s docket reveals
that this will continue to be the case in the future. A whopping 101 of the 138 cases currently
listed as pending on the ACtHPR’s docket are cases involving Tanzania.

4.10 Tunisia
Tunisia’s 2017 declaration is the first by a North African state. This declaration parallels those in
Côte d’Ivoire and the Gambia as it represents a declaration clearly linked to a new political
beginning. This new beginning was the 2011 revolution that toppled President Zine El Abidine
Ben Ali after twenty-three years in power, triggered the “Arab Spring,” and led to the ratification
of a new constitution in 2014.89 Indeed, Tunisia’s subsequent decision to make the declaration
was spurred directly by domestic concerns as it represented an attempt to mitigate problems
associated with the failure thus far to constitute the constitutional court established by the new
constitution. In particular, the declaration was made shortly after the interim judicial body
responsible for constitutional review declared the legislation establishing Tunisia’s Superior
Judicial Council, which is responsible for selecting four of the Tunisian Constitutional Court’s
twelve members, unconstitutional. This delay has proven problematic because the interim body,
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the Instance Provisoire de la Justice Judiciaire, is limited by its enabling act to reviewing the
constitutionality of legislation enacted pursuant to the 2014 constitution.90
Tunisia’s declaration also parallels Côte d’Ivoire’s in that it may also have been made to shore
up the credibility of a new regime accused of its own human rights violations. In particular, it
occurred in the context of increasing domestic and international criticism of alleged human rights
violations committed in the context of an extended state of emergency in effect since a 2015 spate
of terrorist attacks. This criticism has focused upon prosecutions of civilians in military counts,
the imposition of travel restrictions, and allegations of arbitrary arrest and torture.91 Thus, although
Tunisia’s recent declaration has yet to result in any cases adjudicated by the ACtHPR, current
issues make it likely that Tunisia will face more significant compliance costs than many of its
fellow optional declaration states.

5

Conclusions

The record of optional declarations thus far reveals patterns indicative of the future direction of
the ACtHPR. The most common scenario, represented by Benin, Ghana, Malawi, and Mali, has
been commitment by a fairly consolidated full democracy that would face relatively few
compliance costs but which is potentially vulnerable to internal subversion due to a significant
history (even if rather remote) of political instability and/or repression. Thus, whereas states that
had recently transitioned to more democratic modes of governance (states that were often not fully
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democratized) were the ones most likely to ratify the ACtHPR Protocol, the dynamics of optional
declarations have been somewhat different. This reflects the fact that while ratifying the Protocol
is a relatively cost-free way for a new regime to make a symbolic commitment to democracy and
human rights, taking the additional step of making the declaration can entail significant costs.
While the dynamics of transitional situations may on occasion lead non-consolidated democracies
like Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, and Tunisia to commit in spite of these costs (particularly when
the new regime needs to enhance its credibility on human rights issues), this has been and likely
will continue to be slightly less common than the first scenario.
Given that West African states have been particularly likely to make the declaration since they
are already subject to the jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court of Justice, the states that are therefore
the most likely candidates to provide additional declarations are states such as Liberia and Sierra
Leone, West African states that combine high current levels of democratization and human rights
protection with troubled histories of political instability and repression. That both of these states
have recently indicated a willingness to do so is consistent with the pattern of optional declarations
thus far and with the “lock in” thesis.
On the other hand, less likely candidates would be transitional partial democracies as well as
full democracies with little or no history of political instability and/or repression. Thus, for
example, despite being members of ECOWAS, partial democracies such as Guinea and Niger are
less likely candidates to make the declaration, as are states such as Senegal, a full democracy which
has since independence been one of Africa’s most politically stable states. However, although the
number of states subject to the ACtHPR’s full jurisdiction is relatively small and will likely
continue to be for the immediate future, it is important to note the progress that has been made in
a relatively short period of time. For example, despite often being compared negatively to the

https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/thr/vol7/iss1/1

38

Zschirnt: Opening the Doors to Justice in Africa: Analyzing State Acceptanc

European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the ACtHPR
has actually delivered more merits decisions in its first decade than either of those courts did in
their first decades.92 This makes its future development something that should be of the utmost
interest to the international human rights community.
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